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of Cuba. It was presence of offensive weapons that precipitated that problem. Does not mean general security arrangements in Hemisphere under Rio Pact are changed. Problem of indirect aggression remains. Cuba not given right to intervene in internal affairs of other American states.

Our reply to Khrushchev's October 26 letter also means there are no deals (e.g. Berlin, Turkey). No such suspicion should undermine our position in other parts of the world. Purpose of answering Khrushchev's October 26 letter instead of October 27 broadcast was to proceed on assumption that this approach was the real approach.

This crisis as grave for Soviets as for us. Khrushchev knew we were utterly determined to get offensive weapons out of Cuba. What he gets out of it is no war. Also that we go along with his thesis that he's withdrawing missiles in exchange for commitment not to invade Cuba. If he's willing to make that trade, if that's what he needs at this point, let's let him have that. Both are important to him. He knows occasion for invasion as far as we concerned was introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. His intelligence good enough to make clear to him how close to the wire we got. Situation was perilous, and this is no time to gloat.

Settlement of Cuba crisis along indicated lines provides some cause for very guarded optimism that Soviets may be more forthcoming in other areas. Reluctant to state this before Cuban situation really

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pinned down. And would be misleading to apply specific events of Cuba crisis to other world problems. Acceptance of inspection in Cuba does not mean Soviets will accept inspection for arms control or test ban. Settlement in Cuba does not mean there will be no Berlin crisis.

Cuba crisis underlines need for serious, practical disarmament measures. In this framework main question is military confrontation in Europe. We prepared to make serious arms reduction on both sides. President emphasized this problem when he alluded to possible detente between NATO and Warsaw Pact. Inspection still the issue. Remains to be seen if Soviets will be more forthcoming.

Should be noted that inspection of dismantling of offensive weapons in Cuba is not difficult. Most anyone can tell if sites actually being dismantled. Doesn't require nuclear physicist. Dismantling not limited to missiles but to weapons described as offensive -- which defined in quarantine order, and includes bombers. Question of Soviet personnel not at issue apart from offensive weapons.

Time limits on dismantling will be developed in UN talks. If snags develop we right back where we started. Very very short time periods involved. Soviet ships will be permitted through the quarantine to remove weapons from Cuba. Next step in negotiations involves U Thant and Kuznetsov. Many details must be settled. Coordinating committee will be established by US Government. RUSK

END